New Books in Philosophy

What is kinship? This central question in cultural anthropology is standardly answered in terms of culturally constructed relationships that are unconstrained by biological relationships. In Kin Matters: Relational Beings in the Fragile Sciences (Oxford UP, 2026), Robert Wilson proposes an alternative view that does not separate kin relations from biological facts about reproduction that are universally known, such as the fact that human females are pregnant before they give birth. On the Progenerative View, kinship is the cultural elaboration of reproductive relations, which act as constraints on kin relations. Wilson, who is professor of philosophy at the University of Western Australia, also analyzes incest avoidance from this perspective, and draws on clinical findings, primatology, and philosophy of mind and philosophy of biology to develop his biologically-based yet non-reductive and culturally variable view of kinship.

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What is kinship? This central question in cultural anthropology is standardly answered in terms of culturally constructed relationships that are unconstrained by biological relationships. In Kin Matters: Relational Beings in the Fragile Sciences (Oxford UP, 2026), Robert Wilson proposes an alternative view that does not separate kin relations from biological facts about reproduction that are universally known, such as the fact that human females are pregnant before they give birth. On the Progenerative View, kinship is the cultural elaboration of reproductive relations, which act as constraints on kin relations. Wilson, who is professor of philosophy at the University of Western Australia, also analyzes incest avoidance from this perspective, and draws on clinical findings, primatology, and philosophy of mind and philosophy of biology to develop his biologically-based yet non-reductive and culturally variable view of kinship.
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Can laws be unjust and yet remain, in some sense, morally legitimate? In Political Philosophy: The Puzzle of Legitimate Injustice (Princeton UP, 2026), Jonathan Quong considers central issues in political philosophy through the lens of this single question. He explores and evaluates recent influential work on this topic and then proposes a novel approach of his own. The puzzle at the heart of his account is the phenomenon of legitimate injustice—laws and policies that are substantively unjust yet may be legitimately imposed by government officials. How can such laws be legitimate if, as some have argued, justice is the first virtue of social institutions?

Quong analyzes the work of those who deny that injustice committed by states can be legitimate simply by virtue of its democratic or procedural pedigree; the Kantian account of legitimate institutions and justice; instrumental approaches to political legitimacy; and the recent wave of work in democratic theory focused on its egalitarian character. Arguing that these analyses do not offer an adequate solution to the puzzle and that there are compelling reasons to revise or reject them, Quong lays out his view and explains the implications for more general theories of political morality. He argues that we can explain legitimate injustice by appeal to distributive justice. If political disagreement is inevitable, then unjust legislation is largely unavoidable; it constitutes a burden that must be distributed according to just principles. Quong’s novel and illuminating framework offers a unique introduction to crucial questions in political philosophy.
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Metasemantics studies the foundations of meaning, asking what makes it the case that certain words have the meanings that they do. But what makes metasemantic theories true? This question has been all but ignored in philosophy of language. In this book, Cohnitz and Haukioja address this issue and argue that just as in metasemantics, both internalist and externalist answers are available for this foundational question.

The authors introduce and defend meta-internalism, arguing that the foundations of reference and meaning are anchored in the individual dispositions and psychological states of language users, offering an alternative to meta-externalist views that would appeal to broader community-based or otherwise external factors. Meta-internalism is, moreover, compatible with semantic externalism as usually understood, and provides an explanation of why externalism is true. Through a critical examination of prominent theories and thought experiments, the book explores fundamental issues like reference failure, conceptual engineering, and the metaphysical implications of reference, as well as the methodology of theories of reference. With its focus on the foundations of metasemantics, the book provides a fresh and empirically informed perspective on one of the core questions in the philosophy of language. Foundations for Metasemantics (Oxford University Press, 2025) is essential reading for philosophers, scholars, and students seeking to understand the underlying principles that support our theories of meaning and reference.

Daniel Cohnitz is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Utrecht University.

Jussi Haukioja is Professor of philosophy at NTNU Trondheim, Norway.

Carrie Figdor is professor of philosophy at the University of Iowa.
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Central to modern biology and the study of life is the concept of the
organism—roughly, a body with interconnected parts that make specific
contributions to the development and functioning of the whole. There
are competing organism concepts even today, but the 18th century was a
critical period in which thinkers gradually shed prior ideas of life in
terms of a body with a principle of spontaneous motion, a body as a mere
physical mechanism, or a body infused with vital spirits. In When Metaphysics Meets Biology: Kantian approaches to the concept of organism (Routledge, 2026),
Philippe Huneman combines extensive scholarship in the history and
philosophy of biology with Kantian critical philosophy and metaphysics
to trace Kant’s contributions to the emerging organism concept. Huneman
discusses the Critique of the Power of Judgment and other
writings in which Kant developed a view of organisms as natural purposes
and in which part-whole reasoning by the faculty of judgment is a
condition of the possibility of thinking of organisms at all. Huneman,
who is director of research at the Institute of History and Philosophy
of Science and Technology at CNRS and University of Paris 1 –
Pantheon-Sorbonne, provides an account of Kant’s thinking that is
accessible yet promises to bring this neglected aspect of Kant into
dialogue with contemporary Kantian scholarship. 
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