The Trivium China Podcast

The US and China have been quietly testing each other’s limits all summer – and neither side actually knows where the breaking point is.
To discuss the nature – and limits – of the fragile US-China economic détente, we are joined this week by Evan Medeiros, the Penner Family Chair and Director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
Evan’s read: The US-China relationship is at an unstable equilibrium, and in for a snapback toward a much more contentious state of play.  
In this episode, host Andrew Polk and Trivium colleague Cory Combs sit down with Evan to unpack:
Why Xi Jinping’s upcoming state visit to Washington, the first in over a decade, may be the one thing still holding the relationship together
How the trade war became a supply chain war back in April 2025, and why tariffs aren’t the main event anymore
Why China keeps reaching for chokepoints tied to US national security instead of hitting the broader economy, and what that reveals about Beijing’s actual theory of leverage
The uncomfortable new front opening up: Beijing increasingly penalizing American companies for the crime of complying with US laws
It’s another great discussion, so enjoy!

Chinese tech companies keep getting fined and blocked overseas – sometimes unfairly, and sometimes because they’re behaving exactly like they do at home.
Beijing just released a plan to fix both problems at once.
Our take: “China’s nefarious plan to get its companies to obey overseas laws” is a Foreign Affairs headline just waiting to be written.
On this episode, Trivium China podcast host Andrew Polk sits down with Kendra Schaefer (Head of Tech Policy Research) to unpack:
Why lumping AI labs, e-commerce platforms, and cybersecurity firms into the single regulatory category of “cyberspace enterprises” is a bigger deal than it sounds
The story behind AliExpress’s EUR 550 million EU fine, and why Chinese companies keep getting tripped up by rules they don’t fully understand
One vague line in the CAC’s latest policy doc that might matter most: Beijing says it will “regulate the overseas competitive behavior” of its own tech firms, with zero detail on how
Why cleaning up Chinese tech companies’ act abroad might get Beijing branded as the bad guy either way

China’s July macro data just landed, and the title of our monthly macro note says it all: “A Grim Picture.”
Consumption, investment, and property all deteriorated further last month – and the two props that supported the economy in the first half of the year are now fading fast.
On this episode, Trivium China podcast host Andrew Polk sits down with Joe Peissel (Lead Macro Analyst) to unpack:
How July’s slowdown was broad-based, across nearly every metric that matters – and why growth looks even worse than the headlines suggest
How the K-shaped economy has spread from output into investment flows, entrenching the divide between booming and struggling sectors
Why deflation, not inflation, remains the real danger for a heavily indebted economy like China’s – as officials are having to quietly pick their poison
Why even China’s 24% y/y export growth print obscures a much less impressive reality, once you separate price from volume

Chinese companies can’t legally buy the most advanced US-made AI chips, so they’re renting them instead – from data centers in Thailand, Malaysia, and beyond – completely legally.
US policymakers know about the issue – but several years into the implementation of export controls on advanced chips, they still haven’t closed it.
And there’s a reason for that.
On this episode of the Trivium China Podcast, host Andrew Polk sits down with Tom Nunlist (Associate Director, Tech Practice, Shanghai) to unpack:
How Kimi K3’s release forced Washington to confront a loophole in export controls it’s known about for ages
Why renting chips sits completely outside the rules that govern buying them, even when the end result is identical
Why closing this gap risks a “double win” for Beijing: 1) marketing material to court the Global South with China’s AI stack and 2) and potential leverage to retaliate with rare earths, ultimately causing the US to back down
Why cutting off compute access could undermine trust in the US AI stack, like sanctions have eroded trust in the US dollar – and why that risk may be exactly what’s keeping policymakers’ finger off the trigger

When it comes to China’s key nodes of economic leverage, rare earths get all the attention – because they’re the cheapest, easiest lever China has to pull.
But the more durable – and future – points of leverage are already hiding in plain sight, in hundreds of intermediate goods most people never think about.
Gerard DiPippo, Director of Global Macro at Eurasia Group, returns to the pod as our first ever two-time guest, joined by Dinny McMahon and Cory Combs, to unpack it.
On this episode, host Andrew Polk sits down with Gerard, Dinny, and Cory to dive into:
Why rare earths are a uniquely cheap and low-cost weapon for Beijing, and why other chokepoints like batteries carry far higher stakes
How China’s licensing regime doubles as a surveillance system, giving Beijing visibility into global supply chains it can use to ratchet pressure up or down at will
The “shoe that hasn’t dropped yet”: China’s shelved extraterritorial rule that could restrict any product containing Chinese-origin content, anywhere in the world
Why intermediate goods are the next frontier to watch, and why China’s reaction function gets a lot murkier once controls move further down the production chain – into products with real commercial value to Chinese firms themselves
It’s another great discussion – so enjoy!