Insurgent Armies and State Formation after Victory
Episode 136 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines the fate of victorious rebel groups after civil wars—and why some remain loyal to post-war governments while others fragment, defect, or even overthrow the regimes they helped create.
Our guests begin by exploring the core puzzle: conventional wisdom suggests that decisive victory produces stability, yet evidence shows that in more than half of cases, post-war militaries face crises within a decade. They then explain how wartime pressures shape the organizational choices of rebel groups—particularly the relationship between political leaders and field commanders—and how those choices carry forward into peacetime governance. Drawing on cases from Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, and across Africa, the discussion highlights why power-sharing arrangements often fail, why commitment problems undermine loyalty, and how the interests of commanders, rulers, and foreign partners diverge. Finally, the conversation turns to the limits of external security assistance, and what policymakers and practitioners should consider when working with post-conflict militaries.
Dr. Philip A. Martin is an assistant professor at George Mason University. His research specializes in political violence and civil wars, peacebuilding, and African politics. His article, Insurgent Armies: Military Obedience and State Formation after Rebel Victory, serves as the anchor for today’s conversation.
Brigadier General Allen J. Pepper is the commanding general of U.S. Army Security Assistance Command. A career foreign area officer with extensive experience across Africa, he has served in Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic.
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Future of War Part I: Raiders at the Edge of Tomorrow
Episode 135 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast kicks off a four-part series on the future of war, pairing renowned author and futurist August Cole with senior special operations leaders to explore how tomorrow’s conflicts may unfold.
Our conversation centers on Cole’s short story Safe Harbor II, which envisions Marine Raiders operating in a near-future environment saturated with proxy terrorism, relentless information warfare, and AI-enabled surveillance. The story highlights how SOF teams will grapple with great-power adversaries who weaponize terrorist groups to justify intervention, forcing small units to fight not only for tactical advantage but also to control the strategic narrative.
Joining us for this episode is Major General Peter Huntley, Commander of Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Together with August Cole, MajGen Huntley discusses how MARSOC is adapting to new technologies, why trust with partners remains a timeless necessity, and what qualities will continue to define Raiders in the decades ahead. The discussion underscores that while future operators will be hyper-enabled with drones, sensors, and advanced AI, the human dimension of warfare—trust, adaptability, and leadership—remains constant.
At the conclusion of the episode, listeners will hear a narrated excerpt from Safe Harbor II, immersing them in the dilemmas Marine Raiders may face in the conflicts of 2040.
Ben Jebb and Don Edwards are the hosts for this episode. Please reach out to Ben and Don with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
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The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan
Episode 134 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores the rising risks of conflict over Taiwan and how the United States and its allies can strengthen deterrence against Beijing.
Our guests begin by assessing why deterrence is faltering globally, from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and how those events inform Chinese perceptions of American resolve. They then discuss the stakes of a Taiwan contingency—economic, ideological, and strategic—highlighting the island’s critical role in global semiconductor supply chains and as a thriving democracy on China’s periphery. The conversation turns to the balance of forces across the Strait, Taiwan’s defense culture, and the full spectrum of Chinese coercive activity, from gray-zone operations to potential military invasion. Finally, our guests offer recommendations for how Taiwan, the United States, and partners like Japan, Australia, and Europe can bolster deterrence before conflict breaks out.
Matt Pottinger is a distinguished national security professional who served as U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor from 2019 to 2021. He is the editor of The Boiling Moat, a new volume analyzing deterrence and security dynamics across the Taiwan Strait.
Matt Turpin is a former U.S. National Security Council Director for China and a retired U.S. Army officer. He is currently a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where his research focuses on U.S.-China relations and strategic competition.
Ben Jebb and Katherine Michaelson are the hosts for this episode. Please reach out to Ben and Katherine with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
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Winning Without Fighting: Economic Power and Information Warfare (Part 2)
Episode 133 is the second installment in our two-part series exploring how the United States can leverage non-kinetic instruments of power to compete effectively without resorting to military force.
Building on our previous discussion, our guests examine America's strategic blind spots in treating economics and information as support tools rather than primary domains of competition. They discuss the integration challenges across U.S. government agencies, highlighting how autocratic adversaries coordinate their instruments of power more effectively while the U.S. struggles with inter-agency dysfunction. The conversation explores the military's evolving role in peacetime competition, with insights from Afghanistan on the challenges of integrating all elements of American power. Our guests introduce the concept of "resilient interdependence" as an organizing principle for the 21st century—unlike Cold War containment, this approach emphasizes strengthening connections with allies while hardening soft targets like supply chains and digital infrastructure. Finally, they identify critically underused economic tools including export credits, development finance, outbound investment controls, and industrial policy that could strengthen America's competitive position against strategic rivals.
Lieutenant General David W. Barno (Ret.) is a Professor of Practice at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. During his thirty-year Army career, he commanded at every level including nineteen months as the senior American commander in Afghanistan, where he was responsible for 20,000 U.S. and coalition forces and implemented a new counterinsurgency strategy. Following his military service, he served as Director of the Near East South Asia Center at National Defense University and held positions at the Center for a New American Security. He is the co-author of "Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime."
Dr. Rebecca Patterson is the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and Professor of the Practice of International Affairs. A retired U.S. Army officer with over 22 years of experience, she served in Thailand, Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan. She previously served as Deputy Director in the Office of Peacekeeping Operations, Sanctions, and Counter-terrorism at the State Department. She is the author of "The Challenge of Nation-Building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the U.S. Army from World War II to the Iraq War" and the recently published "Winning Without Fighting."
Don Edwards and Jackie Giunta are the hosts for Episode 133. Please reach out to them with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
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Winning Without Fighting: Strategic Culture and Gray Zone Competition (Part 1)
Episode 132 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores how strategic culture shapes approaches to irregular warfare and competition in the gray zone. This is part one of a two-part series examining why nations conceptualize irregular warfare differently and how cultural biases affect competition below the threshold of armed conflict.
Our guests discuss why irregular warfare must be central to American grand strategy in an age of crisis and competition. Dr. Susan Bryant shares insights from her book "Winning Without Fighting," examining how American strategic culture - with its preference for binaries, belief that war is aberrant, and faith in technological solutions - creates disadvantages against adversaries operating in the gray zone. Drawing from their extensive operational and academic experience, both guests explore historical examples from Afghanistan, Iraq, and El Salvador to illustrate how cultural biases and quantification obsession undermine irregular warfare efforts.
Dr. Susan Bryant is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University. A retired Army Colonel with 28 years of service, she is co-author of "Winning Without Fighting" and currently serves as Executive Director of Strategic Education International.
Dr. Thomas X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University. A retired Marine Corps Colonel with 30 years of service, he is the author of "The Sling and the Stone" and has extensive operational experience in insurgency and irregular warfare.
Don Edwards and Julia McClenon are the hosts for Episode 125. Please reach out to them with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast explores an important component of war throughout history. Small wars, drone strikes, special operations forces, counterterrorism, proxies—this podcast covers the full range of topics related to irregular war and features in-depth conversations with guests from the military, academia, and the policy community. The podcast is a collaboration between the Modern War Institute at West Point and Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project.
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